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THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS -ACT
RAMON A. KLITZKE*
In an increasingly complex technological society, the pro-
tection of the commercially valuable ideas that fuel such a so-
ciety is an economic necessity. The law presently protects
such ideas by two methods, each important in its own sphere.
The first method is the federal patent law, effectuated
through a uniform statutory scheme. As an alternative to pat-
ent protection, the law provides a second method for protect-
ing such ideas: trade secret law. Unlike the patent law, the law
of trade secrets is a common law development, hence its prin-
ciples vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In an effort to harmonize and clarify the law of trade
secrets as it has evolved in different states, the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act at their 1979 Annual Conference.' This article will ex-
amine the provisions of the Act, compare the Act with the
common law of trade secrets, and note potential problems in
the application of select provisions of the Act.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE COMMON LAW OF TRADE SECRETS
Before examining the factors indicating the need for a uni-
form act codifying trade secret law and the specific provisions
of the Act itself, the outlines of trade secret law must be
sketched. The fundamental right created by trade secret law
is the owner's entitlement to relief for harm, or potential
harm, caused when his trade secret is taken by misappropria-
tion, that is, improper means.2 Several questions arise in de-
* B.S., Illinois Institute of Technology; J.D., Indiana University; LL.M., New
York University; Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School Admitted to
practice before U.S. Patent and Trademark Office; Wisconsin, Texas and New York
Bars; Reporter, Section on Government and Administrative Law, Wisconsin State
Bar. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable editing of Attorney James R.
Custin of Milwaukee.
1. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 539-40 (Commissioners' Prefatory
Note) (1980).
2. Stewart v. Hook, 118 Ga. 445, 45 S.E. 364 (1903); Junker v. Plummer, 320
Mass. 76, 67 N.E.2d 667 (1946); 0. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149, 72
N.W. 140 (1897); Taber v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889); O'Bear-Nester
Glass Co. v. Anti-Xplo Co., 101 Tex. 431, 108 S.W. 967, reh. denied, 101 Tex. 436, 104
S.W. 931 (1908).
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termining whether "information" is afforded legal protection
under this doctrine: (1) Is the information a trade secret? (2)
Was the information misappropriated? and (3) What reme-
dies are available?
The answer to the first question depends upon the defini-
tion of the term, "trade secret." The definition most often
used3 by courts is that contained in a comment to the Re-
statement of Torts, section 757,4 where it was noted that "[a]
trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business,
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it.""
While this definition of a trade secret is quite broad, its
scope has been narrowed by at least three prerequisites. First,
protection of information under section 757 is limited to that
information which is used continuously in the operation of the
business.8 Thus, information relating to a single or transitory
event, such as a secret bid, or financial data of a nonrecurring
nature, falls outside of the protection of section 757. Second,
although information need not meet the patent law standards
of novelty and nonobviousness to warrant trade secret protec-
tion, it must at least amount to a discovery." Such a discovery
could be of any idea not generally known in the trade secret
owner's trade or business.
A third prerequisite under the definition of a trade secret
is that its owner must exercise reasonable diligence in
preventing the unintended disclosure of the secret." Absolute
secrecy is not required; only substantial secrecy is necessary. 9
3. Milgrim, Trade Secrets, in 12 BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS § 2.01 at 2-3 (1978).
4. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
5. Id.
6. Id. Kane, Limitations on the Law of Trade Secrets, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 162
(1971).
7. A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 864 (1961); Koehring Co. v. E. D. Etnyre & Co., 254 F.
Supp. 334 (N.D. IMI. 1966); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp.
250 (S.D. Cal. 1955), af'd, 283 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869
(1961).
8. Schulenberg v. Signatrol, Inc., 50 Ill. App. 2d 402, 200 N.E.2d 615 (1964);
National Tile Board Corp. v. Panelboard Mfg. Co., 27 N.J. Super. 348, 99 A.2d 440
(1953).
9. Elaborating on this principle, one court noted:
A certain amount of publicity is unavoidable in any manufactory, but an un-
[Vol. 64:277
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
In determining whether a trade secret owner has exercised
reasonable diligence in protecting the information's secrecy,
courts consider a number of factors. Most important among
these factors are the amount of time, expense, effort and risk
involved in keeping the information secret;' 0 the value of the
information to the owner and to his competitors;" and the
specific measures taken to protect the secrets from dis-
closure.1 2
The second critical issue which arises in determining
whether trade secret protection exists is whether the informa-
tion was misappropriated from its owner. This is the grava-
men of a trade secret action because, unlike patented inven-
tions, trade secrets are protected, generally, against one who
has acquired the secret through improper means.' 3 Improper
means include gaining knowledge of the information through
fraud,1 4 use of surreptitious means,15 or participation in a
locked door is not an invitation to the passerby or to the servant of the house-
hold to help himself. Neither does a manufacturer abandon his property in a
design by delivering it or a copy to another for a restricted purpose, nor by a
limited publication. His property rights will be protected in such cases, and he
will be protected against a breach of trust, confidence or contract, and, espe-
cially, will he be protected against a breach of the confidence existing between
employer and employe.
Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 472-73, 60 A. 4, 8
(1904). See also Sundial Corp. v. Rideout, 16 N.J. 252, 108 A.2d 442 (1954); RFATE-
MENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
10. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024, reh. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971); Structural Dynamics
Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1117
(E.D. Mich. 1975); Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa.
1974); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 393 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 1979); RTE
Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 105, 267 N.W.2d 276 (1978).
11. G. ALEXANDER, CoMMERcIAL TORTS 206 (1973); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Ex-
planatory Notes § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
12. RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 105, 118, 267 N.W.2d 226, 233 (1978);
J. Custin, The Law of Dirty Tricks, CONTNUING LEGAL EDUCATION OF WISCONSIN 59,
60 (May 3, 1977).
13. Crocan Corp. v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 385 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Carver
v. Harr, 132 N.J. Eq. 207, 27 A.2d 895 (1942). See also G. ALEXANDER, COMMERCIAL
TORTS 207 (1973); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment a at 3-
4 (1939).
14. Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 56 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1932); Harrington v.
National Outdoor Advertising Co., 355 Mo. 524, 196 S.W.2d 786 (1946).
15. A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1934),
modified, 74 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1935); Godefroy Mfg. Co. v. Lady Lennox Co., 134
S.W.2d 140 (Mo. App. 1939). See also Comment, Industrial Espionage: Piracy of
Secret Scientific and Technical Information, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 911, 927, 934
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wrongful conspiracy."6 In addition to recognizing liability for
discovery of the secret by improper means, 17 the Restatement
of Torts catalogued three other situations in which liability
would be incurred. The Restatement provided that:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret without a
privilege to do so, is liable to the other if...
(b) His disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence
reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him;
or
(c) He learned the secret from a third person with notice of
the facts that it was a secret and that the third person dis-
covered it by improper means or that the third person's dis-
closure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other;
or
(d) He learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was
a secret and that its disclosure was made to him by
mistake.18
Therefore, in addition to recognizing the misappropriation
of a trade secret by tortious conduct or by use of a trade se-
cret with knowledge that it was gained by another by tortious
conduct, misappropriation occurs when there is a breach of a
confidential relationship. Where the defendant breaches a
duty of confidence himself, or uses a secret with knowledge
that it was acquired by such a breach, liability will lie.
Once a trade secret owner determines that the trade secret
was misappropriated by another, the third major issue in the
substantive law of trade secrets arises, specifically, what reme-
dies are available. While the remedies available in any given
case are dependent upon its facts, 19 the general rule is that a
(1967).
16. Harrington v. National Outdoor Advertising Co., 355 Mo. 524, 196 S.W.2d 786
(1946); Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel, 1 S.D. 488, 47 N.W. 814 (1891).
17. RESTATEmENT OF ToRTs § 757(a) (1939) provided that "one who discloses or
uses another's trade secret without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if (a) he
discovered the secret by improper means . .
18. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
19. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment e at 10 (1939)
provides that-
One who has a right under the rule stated in this section is entitled to a rem-
edy or remedies appropriate under the circumstances. He may recover damages
for past harm, or be granted an injunction against future harm by disclosure or
adverse use, or be granted an accounting of the wrongdoer's profits, or have the
physical things embodying the secret, such as designs, patterns, and so forth,
[Vol. 64:277
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plaintiff may pray for both injunctive relief and damages in
the complaint, and either or both forms of relief may be
awarded.20
Injunctive relief will, of course, vary with the nature of the
harm or threatened harm in each case. However, an aggrieved
party may be granted an injunction against future harm
caused by either the secret's disclosure or by its use."1 Fur-
thermore, an injunction ordering the return of "physical
things embodying the secret, such as designs, patterns, and so
forth" may be appropriate.2
Monetary relief for trade secret misappropriation may in-
clude the plaintiff's damages, 23 an accounting of the defen-
dant's profits,2' reasonable royalties,25 punitive damages,2' and
reasonable attorney's fees. 2 7 While it is generally recognized
surrendered by the wrongdoer for destruction. Moreover, he may have two or
more of these remedies in the same action if the court is competent to adminis-
ter them.
20. K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974); RESTATEaENT OF
TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment e at 10 (1939).
21. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment e at 10 (1939).
22. Id.
23. Crocan Corp. v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 385 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ill. 1974); De
Filippis v. Chrysler Corp., 53 F. Supp. 977, aff'd, 159 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 848, reh. denied, 332 U.S. 786 (1947); Kubik, Inc. v. Hull, 56 Mich.
App. 355, 224 N.W.2d 80 (1974); RESTATEmENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757,
comment e at 10 (1939).
24. International Indus. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1957);
Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 56 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1928); Crocan Corp. v. Sheller-
Globe Corp., 385 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. IlM. 1974); Certified Laboratories of Tex., Inc. v.
Rubinson, 303 F. Supp. 1014 (E.D. Pa. 1969); RESTATEMEN OF ToRTS, Explanatory
Notes § 757, comment e at 10 (1939).
25. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.
1974); Carter Prod. Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mo. 1963);
San Manuel Copper Corp. v. Redmond, 8 Ariz. App. 214, 445 P.2d 162 (1968).
26. Components for Research, Inc. v. Isolation Prod. Inc., 241 Cal. App. 2d 726, 50
Cal. Rptr. 829 (1966); Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 154 Conn. 116, 222
A.2d 220 (1966); Quad County Distrib. Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 68 IMI. App. 2d 163,
385-N.E.2d 1108 (1979); Mann v. Tatge Chemical Co., 201 Kan. 326, 440 P.2d 640
(1968). See also Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349 (Mass. 1979)
(allowing trade secret tort damages up to double the amount of actual damages).
27. Forest Labs, Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 211, 213-15 (E.D. Wis.
1970), aff'd sub nom. Forest Labs, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971)
(affirmed in substance but reversed as to award of attorneys' fees); Irving Iron Works
v. Kerlow Steel Floor Covering Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 702, ---, 126 A. 291, 292 (1924). But
see Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Standard Relay Corp., 328 F. Supp. 868, 881-82 (S.D.
N.Y. 1970), afl'd mem., 444 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1971), where the court stated that
attorneys' fees may be awarded only where punitive damages are warranted.
19801
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that these forms of monetary relief are available in actions for
misappropriation of trade secrets, historically there has been
disagreement among the courts over which of the monetary
remedies was most appropriate and whether the award of one
form of monetary relief precluded the award of another. The
court in Telex Corp. v. International Business Machine
Corp.'8 noted, in reviewing the cases exploring the damage is-
sue, that "unfortunately the general law as to the proper mea-
sure of damages in a trade secrets case is far from uniform. 2 9
The trend in recent cases, however, seems to be to allow the
plaintiff to recover whatever forms of monetary relief are nec-
essary to compensate him for his loss.30
H. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
Trade secrets law is of critical importance in protecting
commercially valuable ideas that bestow competitive advan-
tage. As such, it deserves a coherent, systematic, complete and
uniform treatment as a body of law. The Uniform Act is pres-
ently the only such attempt at a systematic treatment of this
area. Accordingly, it should be carefully scrutinized with a
view toward its ultimate adoption.
The development of the law of trade secrets, as a creature
of the common law, was greatly facilitated by the adoption of
sections 757 through 759 (regarding trade secrets and trade
information) of the first Restatement of Torts in 1939.1 The
Restatement was the first attempt to enunciate the generally
accepted principles of trade secrets law. Its principles became
primary authority by adoption in virtually every reported
case.
However, while the Restatement greatly contributed to the
evolution of trade secrets law, two factors worked to prevent it
from providing the uniformity that was essential for such a
commercially significant body of law. The first factor limiting
the effectiveness of the Restatement in providing uniformity
28. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
29. Id. at 930.
30. Milgrim, Trade Secrets, in 12 BusiNzss ORGANIZATIONS § 7.08[3] at 7-167
(1978). The law of damages in the patent area has been heavily borrowed upon in
structuring remedies in trade secret litigation. Id. at 7-156.
31. See notes 4 to 31 supra and accompanying text for insight into the reliance
placed by courts upon Restatement principles.
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was inherent in the work itself. The Restatement is a descrip-
tion of what the American Law Institute sees as the generally
accepted principles of common law. It is expository in nature,
depending upon its adoption by courts for its ultimate effi-
cacy. Jurisdictions considering its pronouncements are free to
adopt or reject them in whole or in part. While courts have
relied heavily upon the Restatement in articulating the con-
cepts of trade secrets law, they have interpreted the Restate-
ment differently. Moreover, after adoption of the Restate-
ment provisions, courts are free to reconsider and then reject
them, a possibility not present with a statutory scheme.
The second factor limiting the overall effectiveness of the
Restatement is that it treated some areas of trade secrets law
inadequately, 2 and others not at all.ss This required the
courts to adopt their own solutions, a situation not conducive
to the uniformity of trade secret law. Moreover, the second
edition of the Restatement of Torts, published in 1979, de-
leted all provisions relating to trade secrets. It was the opinion
of the American Law Institute that trade regulation law, of
which the law of trade secrets was a part, had developed into
an independent body of law no longer based primarily upon
tort principles. It was therefore not appropriate to include
these principles in the Restatement of Torts, Second." Thus,
the American Law Institute has neither considered nor dis-
cussed the law of trade secrets as it has evolved since publica-
tion of the Restatement of Torts, First.
Just as there has not been a current analysis of the body of
trade secrets law by the American Law Institute, state legisla-
tures have failed to examine and legislate in this area. 5 State
statutory effort is usually limited to statutes imposing crimi-
32. See, e.g., the Restatement's inadequate treatment of the issue of damages,
notes 24-31 supra and accompanying text.
33. For example, the Restatement does not deal with the problems which arise in
attempting to apply the statute of limitations to an action for misappropriation of a
trade secret.
34. REsTATMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS at 1 (1979). See Milgrim, Trade Secrets, in
12 BusNEss ORGA IZATIONS §§ 1.01-1.10 (1978). Milgrim examines in detail the
property concept of trade secrets.
35. Minnesota is the exception. That state has adopted the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act. 1980 Minn. Laws, ch. 594, Mn . STAT. ANN. §§ 352C.01 to 352C.08. See
UNORM TR.AD SEcRLrs ACr, 14 U.L_.A 537 (Commissioners' Prefatory Note) (1980).
1980]
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nal liability for theft of trade secrets or to statutes governing
dissemination of trade secrets by governmental bodies.3 6
The conclusion is inescapable. Trade secrets law, a branch
of the law of considerable importance and one which shows
signs of vitality, has been neglected. 7 To fill this void, the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have drafted and
adopted an excellent statute. The intent was to codify the
basic principles of common law trade secrets protection with
some modification and to resolve issues decided differently by
courts in various jurisdictions so as to promote uniformity,
simplicity and fairness. 8
Ill. THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
A. Definitions Under the Act
The definitions section of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act39
delineates the substantive rights created by the Act.40 There-
fore, this section, particularly the definitions of "trade secret"
and "misappropriation," which define important parameters
of the rights created by the Act, will be considered in some
detail.
1. Trade Secret
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act grants the right to injunc-
tive relief for actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade
secret."1 In addition, a complainant may recover damages for
36. A list of such state statutes may be found in ABA SECTION ON PATENT, TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT LAW, 1976 Committee Reports, at 212-16. See also Milgrim,
Trade Secrets, in 12A BusiNEss ORGANZATIONS Appendices B & D (1978).
37. A number of reasons may be found for this neglect. First, trade secret owners
are frequently unaware that they have a legally enforceable right as against those who
misappropriate their trade secrets. Second, even if this right is recognized by a trade
secret owner, he may desire to forego further publication of the secret rather than
pursue his cause of action, a course which would likely require additional disclosures.
Third, some attorneys may not discuss the need for legal protection of trade secrets
or even the manner in which protection is afforded trade secrets with clients. This
problem is compounded because the parameters of trade secret protection generally
defy precise identification.
38. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 537-40 (Commissioners' Prefatory
Note)(1980).
39. UNFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1979).
40. The substantive right created by the Act is set forth in the relief sections of
the Act. See UNIFORM TRADE SEcRETs ACT §§ 2 & 3 (1979). The right given is protec-
tion against misappropriation. Id.
41. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETs ACT § 2 (1979).
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any loss sustained by virtue of the misappropriation of its
trade secret.42
The Act provides a broad definition of a trade secret. The
term "trade secret" is defined by the Act as follows:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pat-
tern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or
process that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.' s
Clearly, there are three essential elements to this definition.
The trade secret must (1) be information, (2) have actual or
potential "independent economic value" stemming from its
secrecy and (3) have been the object of reasonable efforts
designed to maintain its secrecy.
Although the first Restatement of Torts did not, as noted
above, provide a black letter definition of a trade secret, it did
provide a concept which served as a forerunner of the Act's
definition. In its comments to section 757, the Restatement
suggests that a trade secret "may consist of any formula, pat-
tern, device or compilation of information" which is used in
one's business.44 The comments also suggest that a formula
for a chemical compound, a manufacturing process or a
method of treating or preserving materials, a machine pattern
or other such device, or a customer list may constitute a trade
secret. Thus, while the Restatement did not, even in its com-
ments, define a trade secret, it did tacitly recognize, by its
choice of examples, that a trade secret is information. 45 This is
42. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT § 3 (1979).
43. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1979).
44. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 5 (1939). See
also text accompanying note 5 supra.
45. Instead of providing a definition of a trade secret, the Restatement estab-
lished a six-point analytical framework for determining the existence of a trade
secret. The six factors to be considered were:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the business;
(2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the
business;
(3) the extent of the measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information;
1980]
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obviously the source of the Act's definition.
In addition to the examples of trade secrets that the Act
borrowed from the Restatement, the Act adds as examples,
"method," "program" and "technique." Because the Act de-
fines a trade secret as information, this list of examples was
not meant to be all-inclusive. However, it would seem to have
been advisable to include "drawing" in this list. A substantial
number of trade secrets are expressed in technical drawings
and diagrams. Courts will undoubtedly construe the definition
of a trade secret as broad enough to include these forms.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of "drawing" in the laundry list of
examples would remove the question entirely.
It is interesting to note that the Restatement of Torts pro-
vided not only for the protection of trade secrets, but also for
protection of all business information obtained by improper
means. The Restatement provided that: "One who, for the
purpose of advancing a rival business interest procures by im-
proper means information about another's business is liable to
the other for the harm caused by his possession, disclosure or
use of the information. '4 6
Clearly, section 759 is broad enough to apply whenever in-
formation is improperly procured from another, whether or
not the information constitutes a trade secret.47 For example,
section 759 protects secret bids on a contract offering or secret
security investments made or contemplated, even though
these types of information are explicitly recognized in Re-
statement comments as outside of the scope of section 757.4s
However, the value of section 759 to one seeking to protect
information outside the scope of section 757 is diminished by
contradictions appearing in the comments to section 759
which relate to its scope. Comment (b) to section 759 first
notes that all business information falls within the parameters
(4) the amount of effort or money expended in developing the information;
(5) the value of the information to the owner and to his competitors; and
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be acquired or du-
plicated by others.
RESTATEmENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
46. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 759 (1939).
47. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 759, comment b at 23 (1939).
48. RESTATEmENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
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of the section, "whether or not it constitutes a trade secret."'49
Later in the same comment, the scope of the section is said to
be restricted to information of a secret or confidential
nature.50
Obviously, the information must be secret to qualify for
protection under section 757, unless the section 757 definition
was more restrictive. If the same definitional test were applied
to both sections, each would protect the same kinds of infor-
mation. Unfortunately, the Restatement did not explicitly
treat this issue. Instead, comments to section 759 suggest that
the significant difference in the requirements of secrecy re-
volve about the trade secret requirement that the secret be
used continuously in the operation of the owner's business."
Generally, where courts have used section 759 in their de-
cisions, the underlying fact situations lend themselves to the
application of section 757 as well.52  However, some courts
have used section 759 to impose liability when the informa-
tion procured was not of the usual "trade secret" type.5 3 Thus,
the provision has elicited some confusion in the courts.
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act eliminates this confusion
by including "business information," as defined in the Re-
statement, in its broad definition of a trade secret as informa-
tion.5 As a result, "business information" is explicitly sub-
jected to the same standards of secrecy, etc., as is information
used continuously in a trade or business. 55
49. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs, Explanatory Notes § 759, comment b at 23 (1939).
50. Id. at 24.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Franke v. Wiltschek, 115 F. Supp. 28, afl'd, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir.
1953); Chandy v. Chittenden & Mutual Life Ins. Co., 115 Ariz. 32, 563 P.2d 287
(1977).
53. Nucar Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Serv. Inc., 476 F.2d 386 (8th Cir.
1973); McDonald's Corp. v. Moore, 243 F. Supp. 255, aff'd, 363 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.
1966); Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydest, 135 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La.
1955); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 393 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 1979). See gener-
ally Milgrim, Trade Secrets, in 12 BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS § 2.09[8] (1978). In the
Seismograph case, the business information which Seismograph improperly acquired
included the following: (a) that Hastings had a small and poorly financed business,
and (b) the status of Hastings' pending patent application and the fact that he had
not filed patent applications on the surveying application of "Raydest." Seismograph
Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydest, 135 F. Supp. 342, 355 n.20 (E.D. La. 1955).
54. UNIFORM TRADE SEcRFTS AcT § 1(4) (1979).
55. UNIFORM TRADE SEcRETs AcT, 14 U.L.A. 543 (Commissioners' comments to
§ 1) (1980).
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Thus, the Act has defined the term "trade secret" by
phrasing it in terms of the generic concept of "information"
and thereafter providing contours to the scope of relief by ad-
ding additional requirements. This approach eliminates
problems associated with the laundry list approach to defining
a concept. Furthermore, this definition, which combines the
notions of "trade secret" and "business information" as a sin-
gle concept, eliminates problems which arose by virtue of the
Restatement's division of the concepts.
While the Act initially creates broad trade secrets protec-
tion by defining a trade secret as "information," two provi-
sions of the definition restrict the Act's reach. First, the infor-
mation must have actual or potential "independent economic
value" stemming from its secrecy. Second, the information
must be the object of reasonable efforts designed to maintain
its secrecy.
The requirement that information have "independent eco-
nomic value" represents a departure from the position enunci-
ated in the Restatement of Torts. As noted earlier, the Re-
statement distinguished between trade secrets and business
information in that the latter was not used continuously in
the operation of the owner's business."
The Uniform Act rejects this approach in two ways. First,
a trade secret is defined in a generic sense as "information,"
and is thereafter subject to certain modifications.57 Second,
the Act allows protection for information having potential, as
well as actual, economic value.58 The Act, therefore, extends
protection to valuable information not continuously used in
the trade or business. Thus, the Act would provide trade
secret protection for "single event" information, such as a cur-
rent status report, and for information of future value, al-
though not currently in use because of lack of capital or
opportunity.
The original draft of the Act approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws defined
a trade secret as information that derives independent actual
or potential "commercial value" from not being generally
56. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
57. UNIFORM TRADE SEcRETs Acr § 1(4) (1979).
58. Id. § 1(4)(i); 14 U.L.A. 543 (Commissioners' comments to § 1) (1980).
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known.5 The final draft substituted the words "economic
value" for the words "commercial value." 60 Interestingly
enough, the comments to the Act do not explain the signifi-
cance of this change, and, instead, create the impression that
the two terms are synonymous.
However, "economic value" is arguably a much broader
term than "commercial value." A secret could have economic
value without having commercial value. Information regarding
a future manufacturing process may have no present commer-
cial value and yet have economic value, as where time and ef-
fort have been expended in its development. Moreover, the
term "economic value" is elastic enough to include "negative
information," that is, information that a certain process or
formula will not work. It is unclear whether such information
could be said to have commercial value. Therefore, it would
seem that the drafters opted for providing the broadest pro-
tection possible consistent with the underlying principles of
trade secrets law.
Not only must information have economic value to consti-
tute a trade secret, but it must also derive its economic value
from not being generally known by persons who can obtain
economic value from its use or disclosure.6 1 In other words,
the value of the information must arise from its not being
generally known to, or readily ascertainable by, others who
can derive economic gain from such knowledge. Thus, infor-
mation generally known in an industry cannot be a trade se-
cret. Similarly, information developed by independent discov-
ery or other "proper means" is outside of trade secret
protection, as between the parties with such knowledge.
Therefore, the original trade secret owner has no right to pre-
vent use of the information by the subsequent discoverer.2
59. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Draft of
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (1979).
60. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (1979).
61. Id.
62. This is a major difference from the right granted to an inventor under the
Patent Act. A patentee has the exclusive right to make, use and sell the invention for
17 years, even as against one who later conceived the invention independently. The
limited right of the trade secret owner is, on the other hand, somewhat analogous to
the rights of a copyright owner. Independent subsequent creation of a copyrighted
work by another does not result in liability for copyright infringement if there has
been no access to the copyrighted work.
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Whether information is "generally known" is a question of
fact not always susceptible to easy resolution. For example, if
the information is known to a small number of competitors
and there are a large number of competitors unaware of it,
each business competitor possessing the information may en-
joy protection as against those who do not possess it. How-
ever, as an ever increasing number of competitors gain knowl-
edge of the information by independent discovery or by other
proper means, the question of "general knowledge" becomes
more difficult to resolve. The comments to section 1 of the
Uniform Act, not suprisingly, do not provide solid guidelines
for resolving this issue. They merely note that there will be no
trade secret if "the principal person who can obtain economic
benefit from information is aware of it. . . ." Obviously this
issue cannot be resolved by drawing an arbitrary line repre-
senting what is or is not generally known. Not surprisingly,
this problem was present under the language of the Restate-
ment as well.
Another difficult question of fact under the Act which, in-
cidentally, was also present under the Restatement, is
whether an alleged trade secret was "readily ascertainable" by
the alleged misappropriator. This requirement of the Act
makes it necessary for a court to determine whether the infor-
mation to be protected was available without difficulty from
sources other than the owner of the trade secret.
The cases provide little in the way of generally applicable
or sound theoretical principles to resolve this problem. For ex-
ample, in Abbott Laboratories v. Norse Chemical Corp.," Ab-
bott's confidential technology reputedly achieved improved
purity, yield and speed in the basic production process of
cyclamates. Abbott alleged that its process involved at least
nine vital elements that were collectively eligible for trade se-
cret protection. The court attacked the trade secret status of
each element of the process, finding that each step, in turn,
was previously known to chemical engineers, was not used by
the defendant, or was disclosed in foreign or U.S. patents.
With great pains, the trial court carefully explained how each
63. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 543 (Commissioners' comments to
§ 1) (1980).
64. 33 Wis. 2d 445, 147 N.W.2d 529 (1967).
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step had either been anticipated in the prior part"5 or had
been avoided by the defendant's use of other means. On ap-
peal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with this approach
and held that no trade secret could exist.68 The detailed tech-
nical analysis made by the trial court in Abbott seems to place
undue emphasis on the novelty of the trade secret. Novelty is
not a critical characteristic of a trade secret.6 Instead, the
critical question should be the ease with which the informa-
tion could have been ascertained from sources other than the
trade secret owner.
In contrast to the Wisconsin approach to the "availability"
issue is the approach of the Seventh Circuit in Forest Labs,
Inc. v. Pillsbury Co.' s Forest Labs found that the shelf life of
packaged effervescent sweetener tablets could be lengthened
by tempering them in a room having 40 percent or less rela-
tive humidity for a period of 24 to 48 hours.6 9 Pillsbury then
began using a similar process. However, Pillsbury attempted
to prove, as defenses, that its tempering was accomplished
under different conditions70 and that each step in Forest Labs'
procedure was well known in the trade.7 1 The court, applying
Wisconsin law, cited Abbott only to show that Wisconsin
adopted the rule of the Restatement. 2 The court did not use
the Abbott "availability" analysis, nor did it attempt to dis-
tinguish Abbott. Instead, it relied heavily on cases from other
federal courts in holding that a trade secret need not be es-
sentially new, novel or unique to warrant protection, and fur-
ther, that a user of another's protectable trade secret is sub-
ject to liability even if he has modified or improved the trade
65. The majority rule is that the state of the prior part is not relevant to trade
secret determination. See Milgrim, Trade Secrets, in 12 BusINESs ORGANIZATIONS
§ 2.08[3] at 2-90 (1978); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment
b at 6-7 (1939).
66. 33 Wis. 2d 445, 465, 147 N.W.2d 529, 539 (1967).
67. Stanley Aviation Corp. v. United States, 196 U.S.P.Q. 612, 617 (Colo. 1977);
Milgrim, Trade Secrets, in 12 BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS § 2.08[2] at 2-85 (1978); RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 6-7 (1939).
68. 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971).
69. Id. at 623.
70. Id. at 624-25.
71. Forest Labs, Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202, 206 (E.D. Wis. 1970),
afld sub nom. Forest Labs, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971) (af-
firmed in substance but reversed as to award of attorneys' fees).




Thus, the problem of deciding whether information is
"readily ascertainable" remains a difficult question for the
trier of fact. Furthermore, the Act fails to provide any guide-
lines for making this determination. Consequently, this issue
will remain a source of argument.
In addition to the requirement that the information derive
independent economic value from not being generally known,
the Act demands that it be the object of reasonable efforts
designed to maintain its secrecy. 4 This concept is not new.
The Restatement of Torts recognized the need for the owner
of a trade secret to take reasonable steps to protect the se-
crecy of the information. The comments to section 757 note
that, in establishing whether given information is a trade se-
cret, one must consider "the extent of measures taken by him
2275[the owner] to guard the secrecy of the information ....
The comments further recognize this need by noting that a
"substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by
the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in ac-
quiring the information.""8 The Act, however, formalizes the
requirement of secrecy to a much greater extent than did the
Restatement.
The factual issue here is the determination of what consti-
tutes reasonable efforts designed to protect the secrecy of the
information. The Act requires "efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."7 " The com-
ments to the Act indicate that "extreme and unduly expensive
procedures" need not be taken to protect trade secrets against
"flagrant industrial espionage. 7 8
The leading case dealing with the extent of the efforts nec-
essary to protect a trade secret is E.L du Pont de Nemours &
73. Id. at 624-25.
74. UNIFORm TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (1979).
75. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 6 (1939).
This secrecy consideration is one of six factors to be considered in determining if
given information constitutes a trade secret. The others are set forth in note 45
supra.
76. Id.
77. UNIFORM TRADE SEcRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (1979).
78. UNIFORM TRADE SEcR TS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 543 (Commissioners' comments to
§ 1) (1980).
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Co. v. Christopher.79 During du Pont's construction of a
chemical plant at Beaumont, Texas, an undisclosed third
party hired the defendants to take aerial photographs of the
plant. A skilled chemical engineer could, by examining the
photographs, deduce du Pont's highly secret process for mak-
ing methanol, because no protective roof had as yet been
erected over the machinery in the plant. The court held that
du Pont was entitled to trade secret protection, notwithstand-
ing the complete visibility of the trade secret from the air:
To require du Pont to put a roof over the unfinished plant
to guard its secret would impose an enormous expense to
prevent nothing more than a school boy's trick. We intro-
duce here no new or radical ethic since our ethos has never
given moral sanction to piracy.80
Furthermore, the court recognized that although there was
no trespass or other illegal conduct, and no breach of confi-
dential relationship, aerial photography of the plant was an
improper means constituting a misappropriation.8 1 This is a
fair result. The expense or difficulty of shielding the trade se-
cret from all outside observation should correctly weigh heav-
fly in deciding whether reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy
have been expended.
The citation of the Christopher case by the Commissioners
underscores their intent to allow otherwise lawful conduct to
constitute improper means and to allow the courts to consider
all relevant circumstances in determining what reasonable ef-
forts are in a given case. Likewise, it underscores the notion
that the Act does not here depart from accepted common law
principles.
2. Improper Means
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides no legal remedy
unless a trade secret has been misappropriated, that is, ac-
quired by "improper means." The term "improper means" is
a basic building block upon which the framework of the Act
depends.
79. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1970).
80. Id. at 1016-17.
81. Id. at 1014-15.
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The concept of "improper means" is founded upon one of
the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law, that being
"the maintenance of standards of commercial ethics. '8 2 By in-
voking ethical considerations when discussing conduct that
constitutes "improper means," the Commissioners suggest
that "improper means" cannot be precisely defined, but must
be determined in each case by applying prevailing notions of
commercial fair play and integrity.
The Act defines "improper means" to include "theft, brib-
ery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a
duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or
other means . , "88 This definition of "improper means"
was not intended to be exclusive because "[a] complete cata-
logue of improper means is not possible .... ." The full
scope and meaning of the term "improper means" is therefore
found in other sources. The obvious starting point is the Re-
statement of Torts.
"Improper means" is a key concept in section 757 of the
Restatement of Torts. The Uniform Law Commissioners were
undoubtedly inspired by the Restatement to transport this
term verbatim into the Act. "Improper means," as the concept
developed in the cases, is broader than the concept of "illegal
conduct" because an acquisition of a trade secret can be im-
proper without violating any criminal or tort standards of
conduct. For example, in E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Christopher,5 discussed earlier,86 the aerial photography over
the plaintiff's chemical plant, in and of itself, was neither tor-
tious nor otherwise unlawful.87 It did, however, constitute
"improper means" under the Restatement provisions.8
Some of the law that developed under the Restatement is
summarized by the Uniform Law Commissioners in the com-
ment following the definitions section of the Act. The com-
82. Kewaunee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). See also UNIFORM
TRADE SEcRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 542 (Commissioners' comments to § 1) (1980).
83. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(1) (1979).
84. UNIFORM TRADE SEcREsS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 542 (Commissioners' comments to
§ 1) (1980).
85. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1970).
86. See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
87. 431 F.2d 1012, 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970).
88. Id. at 1015.
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ment specifically excludes several types of conduct from the
category of "improper means." Among the proper means ap-
proved by the Commissioners are discovery by independent
invention or reverse engineering, observation of an item in
public use, discovery under license, and derivation from pub-
lished literature."9
3. Misappropriation
There is no legal remedy under the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act unless there has been a "misappropriation." Misappropri-
ations divide into two general categories: those involving the
taking of a trade secret and those involving the voluntary dis-
closure of a trade secret. The key element of most misappro-
priations under the Act is the acquisition of a secret by "im-
proper means." 90
"Misappropriation" includes several distinct species of
conduct. The Act defines "misappropriation" as follows:
"Misappropriation" means:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who
knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was ac-
quired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without
express or implied consent by a person who:
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the
trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason
to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was:
(I) derived from or through a person who had uti-
lized improper means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a
duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use;
(IH) derived from or through a person who owed
a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change in his position, knew or
had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that
89. UNIFORM TRADE SEcRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 542 (Commissioners' comments to
§ 1) (1980).
90. UNIFoRM TRADE SECRETS AT § 1(2) (1979).
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knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or
mistake.9'
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act's approach to the concept
of a misappropriation represents a simplification of its com-
mon law counterpart. At common law, misappropriation of a
trade secret sounded in either tort or contract, depending on
whether the "improper means" was an intentional tort, such
as theft, bribery, misrepresentation or espionage, or was a
breach of a contractually-created duty to maintain secrecy.92
Different approaches attached to tort and contract actions for
misappropriations." In tortious misappropriation cases, the
duty that the defendant breached was imposed by law. In a
contractual misappropriation, the defendant had willingly
accepted the duty. The underlying distinction between the
causes of action led courts to focus on different issues as the
gravamen of the actions.
An examination of the Act shows that the distinction be-
tween tortious and contractual misappropriation has been
eliminated." While a misappropriation may still stem from
the breach of a confidential relationship or from tortious or
criminal misconduct, the underlying cause of action assumes a
character independent of the conduct out of which it has
arisen. This change eliminates many statute of limitation
problems9 5 and damage questions.9"
Misappropriations involving acquisitions are of two basic
types. The first involves the acquisition of a trade secret by
91. Id.
92. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917); North-
ern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1973); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment a at 4 (1939).
93. Two issues treated differently under each cause of action will suffice to llus-
trate the differences. The first issue is the statute of limitations applicable to the
actions brought under each theory. The statute of limitations for a tort action may
differ in length from the statute of limitations for a contract action. See notes 151-56
infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this topic.
The second illustrative issue is that of the availability of punitive damages under
each theory. In general, punitive damages in tort cases are available where the defen-
dant's behavior can be characterized as outrageous, willful and in reckless disregard
of the plaintiff's rights. In contract actions, however, courts are more reluctant to
grant punitive damages.
94. UNiFORM TRADE SEcRETS AcT § 1(2) (1979).
95. See notes 151-67 infra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 128-35 infra and accompanying text.
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one who has knowledge, or who should have knowledge, that
the information was misappropriated from another." The sec-
ond involves acquisition of the trade secret by accident or
mistake.98
Trade secret protection under the Uniform Act is available
against a defendant who received the information from or
through a third person who, in turn, acquired it by improper
means.99 To constitute misappropriation, however, the defen-
dant deriving a trade secret from a third person must know or
have reason to know the relevant facts of the third person's
misappropriation. 100 The Commissioners' comments fail to
suggest standards for the requisite notice for such knowledge
but, because the Act tracks the Restatement at this point, the
Restatement comments will no doubt continue to guide the
courts in this regard.1°1
Comment 1 to Restatement section 757 suggests that no-
tice exists if, "a reasonable man would infer the facts in ques-
tion," or "would be put on inquiry and an inquiry pursued
with reasonable intelligence and diligence would disclose the
facts." 0 2 Illustration 3 in comment 1 covers the fact situation
where A is offered the purchase of manufacturing information
by C, and A knows that it is the trade secret of B, who is A's
competitor. Even though A does not know how C acquired the
secret, A is put on notice that the acquisition would be im-
proper.10 3 Illustration 4 in comment 1 is where A knows that
his competitors have several trade secrets, but he does not
know that a process being offered to him for sale by C is a
trade secret. A knows that C is a trusted employee of A's com-
petitor, B, and that the process is valuable to both A and B. A
would, under these facts, have notice that the process is B's
trade secret if the process is novel to A."°"
An example of court treatment of the notice issue is RTE
97. UNIFoRM TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(2)(i) (1979).
98. Id. at § 1(2)(ii)(C).
99. Id. at §§ 1(2)(ii)(B)(I), (III).
100. Id. at § 1(2)(il)(B).
101. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs, Explanatory Notes § 757, comments k-m at 14-
16 (1939).
102. Id., comment I at 15.
103. Id., Illustration 3 at 15.
104. Id., Illustration 4 at 15-16.
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Corp. v. Coatings, Inc.105 Originally, RTE's 200-ampere con-
nector for use in underground electrical systems was unques-
tionably a trade secret. RTE found that its product could be
improved by employing inertia welding (a friction method) in
its production, and sent a drawing of the connector to the de-
fendant Coatings for the purpose of having Coatings weld
RTE's connectors. RTE unfortunately failed to warn Coatings
that the drawing was confidential. Coatings was first given ex-
press notice of confidentiality four months after the original
drawings were sent, when RTE placed a production order
with Coatings. The purchase orders for the weldments had
printed paragraphs on their reverse sides which set forth an
agreement that all drawings and other information were confi-
dential and not to be disclosed.106 The connectors actually
constituted the trade secret, with or without the inertia
welding.
In refusing any relief for RTE, the court held that a confi-
dential relationship could not be created by implication when
parties were dealing at arms length.10 7 Although the court re-
lied heavily upon the Restatement, it ignored the fact that
Coatings should have had reason to believe that the connector
was a trade secret as much as two years before RTE's weld-
ment order because Coatings had produced several inertia-
welded connectors for RTE's competitors.108 Had the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act applied, Coatings would have, under sec-
tion 1(2)(ii)(B)(II), acquired the trade secret "under circum-
stances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its
use," and a different result would have been obtained.
The RTE case is to be contrasted with the approach taken
in Forest Labs, Inc. v. Pillsbury.10 9 Defendant Pillsbury pur-
chased the assets of a corporation which had received a trade
secret from Forest Labs on a confidential basis. Pillsbury used
the secret without the permission of Forest Labs and without
complying with obligations to Forest Labs that the selling cor-
105. 84 Wis. 2d 105, 267 N.W.2d 226 (1978).
106. Id. at 111, 267 N.W.2d at 229.
107. Id. at 117, 267 N.W.2d at 232.
108. Id. at 117-18, 267 N.W.2d at 232. The court also held that Coatings indepen-
dently developed its own specifications for its electrical connector. Id. at 122, 267
N.W.2d at 232.
109. 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971).
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poration had originally assumed.110 Although the court held
that the mere purchase of the assets of a corporation does not,
by itself, obligate the buyer to comply with the terms of the
prior confidential relationship," it held that Pillsbury had ac-
quired knowledge of the confidentiality of the prior disclosure
after its purchase and before using the trade secret."' This
was sufficient to create a duty not to disclose the information
under section 758(b) of the Restatement."I3 A similar result
would follow from section 1(2)(ii)(B)(llI) of the Uniform Act.
The Uniform Act also protects an owner's trade secret
which was acquired from him "by accident or mistake,"' 14
except where the defendant materially changed his position
without knowledge or reason to know that the information
was acquired by accident or mistake." 5 Accidental disclosure
which may result in misappropriation under section 1(2)
(ii)(C) must not result from a failure to use reasonable efforts
to protect its secrecy." 6 The Uniform Act is here consistent
with section 758 of the Restatement, which also imposed no
liability for an innocent reception of a trade secret without
notice.
The comment to section 758 explains the reason for this
immunity:
The mere use of another's trade secret is not of itself tor-
tious. It is the improper means involved in his discovery of
the secret that makes its use wrongful. If these means dis-
close no misconduct on his own part, but only mistake or
misconduct by others in disclosing the secret, he is not
chargeable with that mistake or misconduct unless he has
notice of it.117
If a person obtains certain information and subsequently
learns that it is really the trade secret of another, both the
Uniform Act and the Restatement impose liability on the ap-
propriator for any use or disclosure thereafter. However, the
110. Id. at 627.
111. Id. at 625.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 626.
114. UNiFoRm TRADE SEcErts Aar § 1(2)(ii)(C) (1979).
115. Id.
116. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AT § 1(4)(ii) (1979).
117. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 758, comment b at 19 (1939).
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Uniform Act departs from the Restatement's "literal conferral
of absolute immunity upon all third parties who have paid
value in good faith for a trade secret misappropriated by an-
other." 18 Under the Act, section 1(2)(ii)(C) would impose lia-
bility in such a situation while the Restatement would not.
The Act would make an unauthorized user of another's trade
secret liable after he learns that the information is a trade se-
cret, even though he had no such knowledge at the time of the
acquisition, provided that he has not materially changed his
position before learning that the information constitutes a
trade secret. This is a fair result.
Finally, the Act provides for protection of a trade secret
against a variety of misappropriations resulting from an af-
firmative disclosure of the information. For example, the Act
secures to the trade secret owner substantive rights against
disclosure by one to whom the owner first voluntarily dis-
closed the secret, provided there were, at the time of the origi-
nal disclosure, "circumstances giving rise to a duty to main-
tain its secrecy or limit its use."119 The subsection of the
Uniform Act that encompasses the "breach of confidence"
phrase of section 757(b) of the Restatement is broader than
the Restatement. For ;ection 757(b) to apply, the trade secret
owner must have knowingly reposed confidence in the person
who first acquired the secret. 120 The language of the Uniform
Act would impose liability regardless of how the duty to main-
tain secrecy arose and regardless of whether the trade secret
owner knew the circumstances of the duty.2 1 Thus, if the in-
formation is gleaned from an employee or other agent, there
can still be a misappropriation. However, the ultimate result
may be the same as it was under the Restatement since the
cases seem to indicate that it is the existence of the confiden-
tial relationship which is important, rather than its manner of
creation.122
118. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 545-46 (Commissioners' comments
to § 2) (1980).
119. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(2)(ii)(B)(II) (1979).
120. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment j at 13 (1939).
121. UNiFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (1979).
122. E.g., Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co. v. Maco, Inc., 195 Neb. 565, 239 N.W.2d
772 (1976); Kamin v. Kuhnau, 232 Or. 139, 374 P.2d 912 (1962). See also RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment j at 13 (1939).
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B. Remedies Under the Uniform Act
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act grants both injunctive re-
lief and damages when a trade secret has been misappropri-
ated. 2 3 This is in-contrast to the Restatement rule, which did
not specify the type of remedy available for the wrongful ac-
quisition, disclosure or use of the trade secret of another; it
indicated only that liability attached.124 The accompanying
comments to the Restatement, however, did note that four
remedies should be available under appropriate circum-
stances: (1) damages for past harm, (2) injunction against fu-
ture harm, (3) accounting of the wrongdoer's profits, and (4)
surrender of the physical things embodying the trade secret. 2 5
All of these remedies are available under the Uniform Act, al-
though they are not specified in the same terms as in the Re-
statement comment.
1. Injunctive Relief
The most important remedy provided by the Uniform Act,
injunctive relief, is provided for in section 2:
(a) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.
Upon application to the court, an injunction may be contin-
ued for an additional reasonable period of time in order to
eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be de-
rived from the misappropriation.
(b) If the court determines that it would be unreasonable to
prohibit future use, an injunction may condition future use
upon payment of a reasonable royalty for no longer than the
period of time the use could have been prohibited.
(c) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect
a trade secret may be compelled by court order.12 6
It is noteworthy that both present and threatened misap-
propriation, as misappropriation is defined in section 1, may
be enjoined. Thus, the employee who has knowledge of trade
secrets when he terminates employment is subject to an in-
junction if there is reason to believe that he may use or dis-
close trade secrets and may be required to surrender any
123. UNIWORM TRA. SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (1979).
124. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
125. Id., Explanatory Notes § 757, comment e at 10.
126. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (1979).
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drawings or other documents containing trade secret informa-
tion that he is attempting to carry away with him. Similarly,
the trade secret disclosed to an outsider in a confidential rela-
tionship can be protected even before any attempted use or
disclosure.
The most potent weapon against misappropriation, injunc-
tive relief, mentioned only in the comments to the Restate-
ment, is expressly provided for in section 2(a) of the Act.
Where a temporary injunction can be obtained, it is fre-
quently determinative of the outcome of the lawsuit for all
practical purposes. The defendant usually concedes the merits
of the case when faced with the substantial additional legal
expense and delay connected with a trial.
A particular problem that has troubled the courts espe-
cially in cases where the trade secret had finally become gen-
erally known or was about to become generally known, is that
of the duration of the injunction.127 If damages are an inade-
quate remedy, the misappropriator should be deprived of the
advantage in lead time over that required by other competi-
tors who had to develop the trade secret independently.
Some courts have granted perpetual injunctions regardless
of the period of time it would have taken the defendant to
develop the trade secret by himself and regardless of how
widely the trade secret had become known at the time of
suit.128 The Uniform Law Commissioners chose to follow a
line of cases which limits the duration of injunctive relief "to
the extent of the temporal advantage over good faith competi-
tors gained by a misappropriator. '1 9
The Commissioners' comments indicate that an injunction
should terminate when a former trade secret becomes gener-
ally known to good faith competitors. 130 The misappropriator
is thus placed in the same position as his competitors; he is
not permanently barred. If the trade secret could have been
127. Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1968); Winston
Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965);
Tolchester Lines, Inc. v. Dowd, 253 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
128. UNwn'OM TRADE SE CnTS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 544 (Commissioners' comments to
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independently developed or discovered by reverse engineering
or otherwise, the maximum appropriate duration of the in-
junction would be that amount of time which the misap-
propriator would have needed to discover the trade secret us-
ing "proper means. ' 13 1 In most cases, the amount of lead time
that the defendant would have taken is debatable. A compari-
son can be made of the time taken by other competitors to
develop the trade secret independently, if one or more of
them had done so.
Where a misappropriation has caused a loss of secrecy
throughout a particular trade, the court is left without any
means to determine what the lead time would have been and,
therefore, a completely satisfactory result cannot be reached.
However, any finite length of time is better than a perpetual
injunction if it is reasonably certain that the trade secret
would have been independently developed or disclosed
eventually.
In the area of mandatory injunctions, the Act appears to
allow relief beyond the scope of that which the Restatement
suggests is available. The Restatement indicates only that a
court can compel the surrender of the physical things
embodying the trade secret.1 32 The Act, on the other hand,
states that "affirmative acts" may be compelled in "appropri-
ate circumstances."'" 3
The myriad of circumstances that may arise when trade
secrets are involved suggests that substantial power and dis-
cretion will necessarily be placed in the hands of the judiciary,
once the trade secret has been proven to exist. Among the "af-
firmative acts" that may be ordered are surrender of physical
embodiments of the trade secret" and the taking of definitive
steps by the misappropriator to prevent further illegal dis-
closure of the trade secret to others. 85 This could sometimes
entail extraordinary measures, such as special directives to
employees and agents or a substantial revision of operations
131. Id., citing K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974).
132. RESTATEMENT O1 TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment e at 10 (1939).
133. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(c) (1979).
134. UNIFORM TRADE SECREts ACr, 14 U.L.A. 546 (Commissioners' comments to
§ 2) (1980).
135. UNIFORM TRADE SE CRETS ACT § 2(c) (1979).
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incorporating the misappropriated trade secret.18 6
A counterpart of the third type of relief suggested by the
Restatement comment - accounting - is also found in the
Act. This section affords a "reasonable royalty" where it is
"unreasonable" to enjoin the use of a trade secret.1 3 7 The
Commissioners give, as an example of an unreasonable injunc-
tion, an injunction against the use of an aircraft weapons con-
trol system, the lack of which would have endangered military
personnel in Viet Nam.135 The key to the unreasonableness
here is an overriding public interest in the manufacture of the
weapons system. Another example of an unreasonable prohi-
bition is where a third party user of the trade secret acquires
it from a misappropriator, but in good faith and with no rea-
son to suspect the misappropriation.189 The Commissioners'
comments state that it would be unreasonable to enjoin such a
third party in some instances, although a reasonable royalty
would certainly be justified. 14 0
2. Damages
The second major remedy allowed by the Uniform Act is
damages:
(a) In addition to or in lieu of injunctive relief, a complain-
ant may recover damages for the actual loss caused by mis-
appropriation. A complainant also may recover for the un-
just enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not
taken into account in computing damages for actual loss.14 2
Although this section allows both injunctive and monetary
relief for a single act of misappropriation, a plaintiff is not
allowed a double recovery. In the usual case where both types
of relief are granted, the monetary award will be limited to
that amount necessary to compensate the injured party for
136. The Act requires trial courts to issue reasonable protective orders to preserve
the secrecy of an alleged trade secret when an action is initiated. UNIFORM TRADE
SEcRE-rs AcT § 5 (1979).
137. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT § 2(b) (1979).
138. UNIFORM TRADE SEcRETs AcT, 14 U.L.A. 545 (Commissioners' comments to
§ 2, citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. Schenk, 152 U.S.P.Q. 830 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967))
(1980).
139. Id. at 545-46 (Commissioners' comments to § 2).
140. Id. at 546.
141. Id. at § 3(a).
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the loss incurred during the period in which the injunction is
not effective. 142 The monetary compensation available under
the Act during such periods includes both that attributable to
actual losses and to the unjust enrichment received by the
misappropriator as a result of the misappropriation.4 In
adopting this approach, the Act follows the prevailing princi-
ple of the recent case law in this area.144 As with injunctive
relief, monetary recovery for misappropriation is appropriate
only for that limited period during which a trade secret is en-
titled to protection. 45 This period includes the time, if any,
during which a misappropriator retains an advantage over
good faith competitors because of a misappropriation.246
A difficult question of who is entitled to monetary relief
for a misappropriation would sometimes arise under the lan-
guage of the Act. For example, where more than one competi-
tor owns and uses a trade secret, all of them may sustain ac-
tual loss caused by a misappropriation from any one of them.
While the language of section 3(a) allows recovery in damages
for actual loss or unjust enrichment "caused by misappropria-
tion," without any qualification as to which trade secret owner
is the victim of the actual misappropriation, a comment to
that section states that only the trade secret owner from
whom there was a misappropriation is entitled to a remedy. 47
If the Commissioners' comments attain the same degree of au-
thority that the comments to the Restatement enjoyed, then
the courts will probably limit relief to the trade secret owner
who was personally victimized. It must be remembered, how-
ever, that it is the text of the Act alone, exclusive of the com-
ments, that will be enacted by state legislatures as the appli-
cable law. The situation posited is a very real possibility.
Since the Act provides no clear answer to this issue, resolution
142. Id. at 547 (Commissioners' comments to § 3).
143. Id.
144. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, reh. de-
nied, 505 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1974); Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972);
Sperry Rand Corp. v. A.T.O., Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017, reh.
denied, 459 F.2d 19 (4th Cir. 1971).
145. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.LA. 546-57 (Commissioners' comments
to § 3) (1980).
146. Id. at 547.
147. Id. at 548.
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must await the proper case and forthcoming judicial
interpretation.
It is interesting to note that section 3(a) provides for re-
covery for unjust enrichment. Some cases have awarded dam-
ages for both actual loss and for unjust enrichment thus al-
lowing a double recovery.1 48 The Commissioners rejected this
approach.149
Under the Act, willful and malicious misappropriation may
result in an award of punitive damages:
(b) If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the
court may award exemplary damages in an amount not
exceeding twice any award made under subsection
(a).150
An award of exemplary damages is entirely appropriate where
the misappropriation has been deliberate and harm has been
intended.
C. The Statute of Limitations
Unlike the Restatement of Torts, the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act specifically provides for a statute of limitations in
trade secret actions. The Act provides that:
An action for misappropriation must be brought within 3
years after the misappropriation is discovered or by the ex-
ercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.
For the purposes of this section, a continuing misappropria-
tion constitutes a single claim.'m
The Restatement of Torts, on the other hand, offers no
clue as to what the statute of limitations should be for misap-
propriation of a trade secret. At one point, the Restatement
comments suggest that the action sounds in contract, which
implies that the contract statute of limitations would apply.152
Elsewhere, however, the Restatement comments note that the
action arises from tort, justifying the application of the tort
148. Id. at 547 (Commissioners' comments to § 2, citing Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.,
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975)) (1980).
149. Id.
150. UlFOrM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(b) (1979).
151. Id. at § 6 (1979).
152. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b at 4, comment
j at 13 (1939).
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statute of limitations.153 This distinction was not without
some justification, because the character of the cause of action
under common law principles turned on the nature of the de-
fendant's conduct. If the defendant acquired the information
by theft, bribery, espionage, or misrepresentation, the act by
which the information was secured was a tort.1 " On the other
hand, if the information was acquired by the defendant as a
result of a breach of a contractual duty to maintain secrecy,
the act giving rise to the action constituted a breach of con-
tract.1 55 Hence, the common law application of a statute of
limitations gave rise to unfortunate inequities. A plaintiff's
right to recover for a misappropriation of his trade secret
would depend not upon the wrong inflicted upon him, but
rather upon the defendant's choice of the means to accom-
plish the wrongful end.
Fortunately, the Uniform Act eliminates this undesirable
result. The Commissioners' end is achieved by incorporating
within the concepts of a "misappropriation" and "improper
means" the contract and tort theories existing under the com-
mon law and the Restatement of Torts and by providing a
uniform statute of limitations associated with claims arising
thereunder.
In addition to providing a solution to the question of
whether to apply a contract or tort statute of limitations to a
misappropriation of a trade secret, the Act eliminates a split
of authority on the question of when the statute begins to run.
One line of authority held that each day's use of another's
trade secret by a misappropriator constituted a new and dis-
crete wrong.156 Therefore, a new statute of limitations period
applied to each day's use because there was a "continuing
wrong." This approach, of course, extended an aggrieved's
right to recover for a misappropriation. A second line of au-
thority held that the date of the first use of a trade secret was
the time of misappropriation. This line of authority thus re-
153. Id., comment e at 10, comment h at 12.
154. E.g., Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir.
1973).
155. E.g., Mixing Equipment Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1269,
modified, 436 F.2d 1308 (3d Cir. 1970).
156. E.g., Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950
(D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967).
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jected the "continuing wrong" theory, holding that the statute
began to run with the first use. 157 This theory shortened the
period during which the plaintiff had a right to recover for a
misappropriation.
The "continuing wrong" theory was followed in Under-
water Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co.,15 8 in which a
trade secret was considered to be a type of property. Conse-
quently, each use of the trade secret was considered a sepa-
rate misappropriation of the trade secret and, therefore, a
separate wrong. The statute of limitations, thus, ran from the
date of each misappropriation. 159
The "continuing wrong" theory was rejected in Monolith
Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical
Corp.160 In that case, the plaintiff, Monolith, wanted Kaiser to
produce metal shims for its rotary cement kilns. 1' To this end
Monolith disclosed to Kaiser, in confidence, a secret improve-
ment it had made in the bricks used to line the cement
kilns."6 2 Thereafter, Kaiser, without Monolith's knowledge,
began to sell the improved bricks.163 After the statute of limi-
tations had expired with respect to the first unauthorized sale
of the improved bricks, but before the statute had expired
with respect to the date of the last sale of the improved
bricks, an action was brought by Monolith against Kaiser for
misappropriation.' The court held that the statute of limita-
tions began to run on the date of the initial misappropriation,
and that any recovery by Monolith was therefore barred.0 5 In
so holding, the court reasoned that Monolith's action was in
the nature of one for breach of a confidential relationship; this
being the case, there could only be one wrong, that occurring
upon the initial misappropriation.1 66
157. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 407
F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969).
158. 371 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967).
159. Id. at 953.
160. 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969).
161. Id. at 291.
162. Id. at 291-92.
163. Id. at 292.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 293.
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The Act's approach is a compromise between these two
lines of authority. The comment to the section points out:
This Act rejects a continuing approach to the statute of
limitations but delays the commencement of the limitation
period until an aggrieved person discovers or reasonably
should have discovered the existence of misappropriation.1
This solution to the problem is sensible for it clarifies the date
at which the statute of limitations begins to run while recog-
nizing the inequity resulting to trade secret owners as a result
of mechanical operation of the first use theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
In technological society, innovative ideas assume a promi-
nent role in the health and vigor of commerce and industry.
As ideas acquire substantial value to business competitors, the
law must respond by protecting them from loss to other com-
petitors. The patent and trade secret laws provide alternatives
for protecting innovative ideas from such loss.
Unlike patent protection, trade secret protection is a crea-
ture of the common law. As such, its development has been
piecemeal within separate jurisdictions. Moreover, sometimes
the evolution of trade secret law has proceeded along different
lines in different jurisdictions. Finally, the common law devel-
opment failed, at times, to deal adequately with important
trade secrets issues. This lack of uniformity and piecemeal de-
velopment of trade secret law has limited its effectiveness in
policing thefts of trade secrets.
In an effort to harmonize and clarify the law of trade
secrets as it has developed in different states, the Commis-
sioners of Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act at their 1979 Annual Conference. The Act is a
concisely drafted integration of the generally accepted princi-
ples of trade secret law. The Act draws heavily upon concepts
in the first Restatement of Torts in the formulation of basic
principles. Moreover, through some conceptual changes, the
Act greatly facilitates treatment of problems not adequately
dealt with by the common law. Finally, in those instances in
167. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 549 (Commissioners' comments to
§ 6) (1980).
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which a split of authority developed, the Act makes fair and
equitable choices among competing alternative solutions.
The Act, if adopted, would promote uniformity, simplicity
and fairness in the litigation of trade secrets issues. Hopefully
state legislatures will favorably consider its adoption. The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act is a major contribution to the pro-
gress of the jurisprudence of intellectual property.
